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BOOK REVIEW
THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ORDER: CONCENTRATION REGULATION AND

PUBLIC

POLICY. By Samuel R. Reid. New York: McGraw-Hill

Book Company, 1976. Pp. xv, 282. $9.95.
PROPERTY, MARKETS, AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION:

A TEXT-

BOOK IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND ITS CURRENT APPLICATIONS.

By Daniel Orr. Pacific Palisades: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1976. Pp. xiii, 398. $11.95.
Economics propels itself into the confines of legal thought
more than any other discipline. Because so much of our consciousness is committed to the condition of our existence, the
work of legal institutions is usually intertwined with our economic environment. Therefore, while the two disciplines have
developed divergent theoretical instincts and methods, they
share a materialist common denominator. Lawyers have a
practical incentive to understand economics. Legal institutions
revolve around an economic view of the world which may be
very archaic and unsophisticated. Legal theory can be enhanced by support from economics, but cooperation and
understanding between the two disciplines is not commensurate with their interrelationship. More effort must be made to
facilitate communication between economists and attorneys.,
The legal community should aggressively seek this exchange: lawyers armed with a basic understanding of econom-

ics will be more valuable to clients and to society. This has
been recognized in such areas as antitrust and government
regulation, 2 and recently in other fields of law.' For this reason,
the books that Reid and Orr have written will be worth any
lawyer's time.
I Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARV. L. REv. 226 (1960). See Baumol, Reasonable Rules for Rate Regulation:Plausible Policies for an Imperfect World in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 187,
188 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1970).
2 Any of the modern texts on antitrust or trade regulation contain interspersed
discussions of economics. See, e.g., D. BoIS AND P. VERKUIL, PUBLIC CONTROL OF
BUSINESS (1977); T. MORGAN, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS (1976); A.D. NEALE,
ANTITRUST'LAws OF THE USA (1970); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES
AND OTHER MATERIALS (1974); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST (1977).
1 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972).
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The area of economics most useful to lawyers is microeconomics or, more narrowly, industrial organization economics.
Both books fall into this category, but they differ substantially
in content. The Reid book presents factual information about
the performances of our basic economic institutions, whereas
the Orr book teaches background microeconomic theory to aid
in understanding the implications of this performance. Yet,
they both stay comfortably close to situations non-economists
can identify with. This tangibleness should encourage lawyers
to study their content.
The Reid book will be a helpful, but pessimistic, guide to
economic performance information. In many ways it is a bibliography: it summarizes many of the studies which attempt to
document the breakdown of our economic structure. Despite
the pretentious title, it is not a groundbreaking work. It does
not expound on a "new industrial order," but rather it recapitulates problems and remedies recognized for generations. Indeed, the author advocates both implicitly and explicitly renewed attention to "traditional economic concepts."' This
work is valuable as a concise reference. The problems Reid
emphasizes stay with us for generations and change only, it
seems, for the worse. Very few authors can create new direction
for fashionable thinking, but the persistence of our economic
problems indicates that ready availability of well-established
information may be more important to improving conditions
than fashionable new theories would be.
Reid's theme is the horrors of increased economic concentration. The author blames a wide variety of the ills of our
economic performance on this concentration and repeatedly
bemoans the mergers and acquisitions which increase this concentration. Relying on his earlier study of the merger move-.
ment, 5 he provides us with many references to economic indictments of the consolidation of economic power.' Given the author's bias, this information will be of great practical utility to
I S.R. REID, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL

ORDER: CONCENTRATION REGULATION AND PUBLIC

POLICY 7 (1976).
S.R. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS, AND THE ECONOMY (1968).
Readers should not take Reid's conclusions with quite the irrefutable force with
which they are presented. See Horvitz and Shull, The Bank Merger Act a Decade
After: Reply to Reid, 19 ANT. BULL. 321 (1974).
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plaintiffs' antitrust lawyers, challengers of certain regulatory
actions, and those advocating vigorous antimerger policy; yet
the book is also worthwhile for those who wish merely to understand why so many take a pessimistic view of our economic
future.
The author references studies which show how economic
concentration adversely affects our everyday existence. As
investors, for example, we should be impressed by numerous
demonstrations of the adverse impact of mergers on earnings
by shareholders. The author shows that the impetus for mergers is the advantage which accrues to managers and corporate
officers rather than to the corporate entity itself.7 The author
also shows other ways in which the adverse consequences of
concentration may touch us directly. He notes, for example,
that the consolidation of industries decreases demand for
labor.' Further, and of interest to law review readers, the author describes how this decrease in labor demand includes attorneys, especially local attorneys. 9
The author claims that the theoretically impossible occurrence of inflation combined with decreased demand and
increased unemployment is the result of the increase in concentration.' 0 This analysis indicates the relationship industrial
organization study may have to finding solutions to economywide problems." In particular, we see that the merger movement heats up the economy without increasing industrial output. The result of this industrial organization trend is the aggregate macro-impact known as "stagflation. ' '' 2
REID, supra note 4, at 102-03. The disparate interest of managers (technocrats)
from shareholders and the corporation is discussed in depth by J.K. Galbraith in THE
NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE

REID,
"

(1967).

supra note 4, at 237.

Id. at 247.
Id. at 251-55.

" Industrial organization economics has much to say about the link between
structural bottlenecks within markets leading to seemingly unmanageable macroeconomics, or economy-wide, problems and about the economists' forecasting failures. See
W. F. Mueller, Industrial Concentration: An Important Inflationary Force? in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 280-306 (H.J. Goldschmid, H.M.
Mann, & J.F. Weston eds. 1974) and authorities cited therein.
12 "Stagflation," the occurrence of stagnation and inflation is, in simple terms, the
result of mergers which cause an increased transfer of money without producing anything except an increased demand for money.
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In addition, the impact of increased concentration transcends these specific short-run effects. Reid provides us with
ample scholarship indicating that increased concentration has
resulted in a substantial deterioration of our competitive market structure. Our economy depends on the automatic regulatory devices of the market. It has long been recognized that
high concentration of economic power inhibits the working of
the market mechanism. While the local or immediate impact
of this breakdown receives a significant amount of attention,
the subtle impact, though less noticeable, is more frightening
because it may result in the destruction of our economic culture. Nor is the threat limited to the economic environment;
the consolidation of economic power also threatens our political
3

institutions. '

These horrifying prospects have been recognized since economic theorists first began to understand how a market economy works. What is now becoming general knowledge, and
what Reid makes abundantly clear, is that every remedy is
absorbed by the seemingly inexorable consolidation movement. He notes that each new major piece of anti-consolidation
legislation is followed by greatly increased merger activity
(which is apparently followed by inflation/depression). I This
cycle raises doubts as to the long-run impact of the recently
proposed antitrust laws or any other traditional antitrust remedy. Perhaps we need an entirely new direction in our
legal/economic remedial approaches.
Reid cites numerous active proposals for reforming antitrust laws, including techniques for stopping or reversing concentration. I5 Yet, one of the major problems in microeconomics, ignored by Reid and many industrial organization reformers, is the poor quality of the data.'" Perhaps previous solutions
have had negative effects because the first step of reform, se, See J.S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 90-92 (2d ed. 1968).
" REID, supra note 4, at 70.
' Id. at 264-76. Although receptive to those proposals, he has previously noted
that the economic environment provides a much better deterrent than legal sanctions.
Id. at 148, 157. He prefers solutions aimed in this direction. Id. at 273-74.
1' A Federal Trade Commission study shows, as it could through its special access,
the deficiencies in the data upon which government economists draw their conclusions.
STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE QUALITY OF DATA AS A FACTOR

IN ANALYSES OF STRUCTURE-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIPS

(1971).
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curing accurate information, has not been sufficiently emphasized.17 If so, one of the most important developments is the
tacit authorization of the "line-of-business" reporting function
in the Federal Trade Commission." Unfortunately, until recently, administrative timidity and judicial interference have
disarmed this program.' 9 Hopefully the program will be operational soon and will be used to formulate effective regulation
of the economy. Accurate information must precede remedial
action.
No doubt anyone touched by Reid's pessimistic economic
conclusions will support any effort to reverse the trend documented by the studies compiled in this book. This enlightening
work deserves the close attention of the entire legal community. Those who wish to do something will find a valuable
beginning reference source in Reid's book.
Orr's book, on the other hand, is much broader and is a
more objectively theoretical survey of market economics. Although it is labeled a textbook, its treatment of economic theories is fashioned in a way that should appeal to lawyers. The
author manages to present the theories so that they relate to
real-world situations. This is accomplished by effective use of
realistic examples, sometimes cast as "simple fables." He demonstrates the concept of interest, for example, by our own preference for a dollar now rather than a year from now: A dollar
is worth more to us if we receive it today than if we know we
17An Antitrust Task Force, Reid notes, did propose improvements in "the quality
and availability of economic and financial data relevant to the formulation of antitrust policy." REID, supra note 4, at 269.
"1 "Line-of-business" reporting requires certain corporations to file business data
broken down according to industry or the various markets in which they sell. It is
anticipated that this will provide more accurate and useful economic data. 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3502 and 3512 did not actually authorize "line-of-business" reporting, but did
transfer approval power to the General Accounting Office, an arm of Congress, when
businessmen had been able to stop the program through the Office of Management and
Budget, an executive office. Though the Federal Trade Commission did not lack authority before, a strong mandate for "line-of-business" reports can be found in the
history of the legislation.
"1 Hopefully the appointment of activist Michael Pertschuk to the chairmanship
of the Commission will revitalize the agency. Any judicial impediment should be
removed by the excellent and comprehensive opinion in In re FTC Corporate Patterns

Report, Master File Misc. 76-0126 and In re FTC Line of Business Report, Master File
Misc. 76-0127 (D.D.C. April 12, 1977).
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will not receive it for a year. 20 His stories and examples ring true
because, stripped of their hypothetical presentation, they are
realistic and understandable.2 '
Orr also gains our attention because we are forced to conceptualize common problems in terms of economic theories.
For example, the operation of the market is introduced in terms
of its effect on the loss of scenic environment 2 and its relationship to racial problems.23 By focusing the discussion of theories
on their relationship to current social issues, Orr keeps us interested in those theories. In short, this work appears to be a very
useful self-teaching tool for one with virtually no economic
training.
Despite its general simplicity, however, the book does contain some advanced material. These sections should not immediately repel those of us who have long since developed the
habit of avoiding anything which smacks of mathematics. The
author has made a conscious effort to insulate the unsophisticated from this confusion. The book does include technical
sections for those who want more depth, but these are carefully
marked so they are easily bypassed by those who will find fog
rather than sunlight.
This book is a teaching tool and not an authority. A lawyer
looking for authority to cite on industrial organization should
look to Scherer, 24 which has somewhat displaced Bain's foundation piece25 as the basic authority in the area. Scherer's work
assumes that the reader is more knowledgeable; hence, while
comprehensible to the uninitiated, he does not present the
20

D.

ORR, PROPERTY, MARKETS, AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION: A TEXTBooK IN

MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND ITS CURRENT APPLICATIONS 175 (1976).

" For example, the author presents a convict fable, id. at 24, which must be
derived from a classic study of the evolution of a market economy in a prisoner-of-war
camp. Radford, The Economic Organizationof a P. O. W. Camp, XII ECONOMICA 189201 (Nov. 1945) (New series).
2 ORR, supra note 20, at 14.
"1 Id. at 15-16.
24 F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1970). See also W.G. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER AND ECONOMIC WELFARE (1970); W.G.
SHEPHERD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET POWER: ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND PUBLIC

ENTERPRISE (1975).
21 J.S. BAIN, supra note 13. See also, J.S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION
(1956) (a combination text and empirical work that first tested interrelationships
between concentration and barriers to entry and their joint effects on performance).
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material from quite as elementary a starting point. More importantly, Scherer does not pay such consistent attention to the
lack of formal economic training of those outside the discipline.
These two books share an aggressively practical look into
a useful area of economics. Taken together they offer a concise
education in industrial organization economics, an education
which is increasingly important in areas such as corporation
law or any of the various substantive areas of administrative
law.
Charles Koch, Jr.*
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A. 1966, University of

Maryland; J.D. 1969, George Washington University, LL.M. 1975, University of
Chicago.

